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Appellant's Brief .

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This case involves a priority claim for reimbursement by the Department of
Health and Welfare (Department), from a recipient of medical assistance (Medicaid) from
that portion of his settlement subject to a lien under federal and state Medicaid laws. The
issue is identical to that presented in Supreme Court Docket #34495. The Argument
found herein is virtually identical to that found in the above docket number. The
Standard of Review is the most recent standard mentioned by the Court.
B.

Statement of Facts.

On June 17, 2004, Matey's son (Jess Matey) was involved in a motor vehicle
collision in which he sustained a traumatic brain injury (TBI). (R. pgs.5-6). He is
eligible for benefits under the Social Security Act for supplemental security income and
for Medicaid under state and federal law. (R. pg. 6). Jess began receiving Medicaid
benefits on June 17, 2004, and had received approximately $60,774.56 in Medicaid
Benefits as of the date of the Petition to Settle Underinsured Motor Vehicle Claim of
Incapacitated Person and Approve Payment to Special Needs Trust (Hereinafter Petition
to Approve Trust). Matey does not dispute this figure. (R. pg. 38).
At the time of the collision, the Mateys were insured with State Farm with an
underlying policy with underinsured motor vehicle coverage limits of $250,000 and an
umbrella policy that provided an additional $1,000,000.00 in underinsured motor vehicle
coverage. (R. pg. 6). ARer some time, State Farm offered, under certain conditions, to
pay to the Mateys the sum of $1,250,000.00. (R. pg. 6). On June 29, 2006, the Mateys
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petitioned the court to approve a special needs trust pursuant to Idaho Code

68-1405

without reimbursing Medicaid for the amount expended. (R. pg. 6).
C.

Statement of the Proceeding.

On or about June 29, 2006, Respondents' Chris J. Matey and Pam S. Matey
(bereinafter referred to as "Matey") filed a PETITION TO SETTLE UNDERINSURED
MOTOR VEHICLE CLAIM OF INCAPACITATED PERSON AND APPROVE
PAYMENT TO SPECIAL NEEDS TRUST (Petition). The Idaho Department of Health
and Welfare filed an objection, titled OBJECTION TO PETITION TO SETTLE AND
APPROVE TRUST, on July 19, 2006, asserting that no settlement funds should be paid
to the special needs trust until the Department's Medicaid statutory lien, in the amount of
$76,757.70 was satisfied as required by Idaho Code § 68-1405(4). A hearing by
telephone was held on July 25,2006, on Matey's MOTION FOR LEAVE TO DEPOSIT
FUNDS WITH THE COURT AND TO CONDUCT BIFURCATED PROCEEDING ON
THE PETITION TO SETTLE UNDERINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE CLAIM. The
Motion was denied. On September 26, 2006, a hearing was held before the Magistrate,
and on October 10,2006, a SECOND MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER was
issued granting Matey's request to settle the claim and pay to the Department the sum of
$3,818.26 minus Medicaid's share of attorney fees. This amount was increased by the
Order issued on November 2, 2006, to the amount of $4,817.88 (.305% of the amount
paid by Medicaid), minus attorney fees in the amount of $282.58. A timely appeal was
taken to the district court which affirmed the magistrate's decision. It is from this
decision that the Department appeals.
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11. ISSUE ON APPEAL
Whether the court erred in prohibiting the Department from recovering medical
expenses paid by Medicaid from that part of a settlement that represents, or can
reasonably be construed as representing, medical expenses.
111. ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review.
The Supreme Court has recently altered the standard by which it reviews a decision

of the district court acting in its appellate capacity. Rather than directly reviewing the
magistrate court's decision independently of, but with due regard for, the district court's
decision, the Supreme Court instead directly reviews the district court's decision. Losser v.
Bradstreet, -P.3d,

2008 WL 820025 (Idaho) (March 28, 2008). The Court examines

the magistrate's record to determine whether there is substantial and competent evidence to
support the magistrate's fmdings of fact and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law
follow from those findings. If those findings are so supported and the conclusions follow
thereeom and if the district court affirmed the magistrate's decision, The Supreme Court will
affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure. Id.; Nicholls v. Blaser, 102
Idaho 559,633 P.2d 1137 (1981).

The issue presented in this case is an issue of law and involves the interpretation
of Medicaid law and other relevant statutes. The interpretation of statutes is an issue of
law over which the court exercises free review. Dyet v. McKinley, 139 Idaho 526, 81
P.3d 1236, 1238 (2003); Driver v. SI Corn., 139 Idaho 423, 80 P.3d 1024, 1028 (2003).
State ex rel. Industrial Com'n v. Bible Missionarv Church, Inc., 138 Idaho 847, 849, 70
P.3d 685,687 (2003).
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B.

Acceptance of Medicaid Benefits Requires Reimbursement.

Medicaid is a joint state-federal program to provide medical care to those who are
unable to provide for themselves. As a condition of eligibility, Medicaid recipients must
assign to the State any rights they may have to seek payment from any third party up to
the amount of medical assistance paid. See 42 U.S.C.
$433.146(c).

8

1396k(a)(l)(A); 42 C.F.R.

Medicaid recipients must cooperate with the state agency by identifying

potentially liable third parties and by providing information to enable the agency to
pursue them.

See 42 C.F.R.

8 433.145(a)(2); 42 C.F.R. 5 433.147(a)(2), (b)(5); 42

C.F.R. Ej 433.148(a)(2). Recipients must also take reasonable measures, on their own
behalf, to obtain payment of medical expenses. See 42 U.S.C. $ 1396k(a)(l)(B)(i); 42
C.F.R. Ej 433.145(a)(2), 42 C.F.R. $ 433.147@)(5). An individual's failure to meet any
of these obligations imperils his or her eligibility for benefits under the statute.
To enable the Department to pursue repayment from responsible third parties, the
Idaho Legislature has enacted Idaho Code Ej 56-209b. An Idaho Medicaid recipient, or
his representative, at the time of application and as a condition of eligibility, must assign
to the Department his rights to any payment from a third party, including, but not limited
to a tortfeasor, for care or other medical benefits. See Idaho Code 5 56-209b(4). Under
Idaho Code Ej 56-209b(5) the Department "shall have priority to any amount received
from a third party or entity which can reasonably be consbued to compensate the
recipient for the occurrence giving rise to the need for medical assistance whether the
settlement or judgment is obtained through the subrogation right of the department or
through recovery by the recipient, and whether the recipient is made whole by the amount
recovered." The statute goes on to state specifically that the "...department will be
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entitled to reimbursement of medical assistance benefits paid on behalf of the recipient
arising from the incident or occurrence

& to any amount being distributed to the

recipient." [Emphasis added.]
Thus, the statutory authority for the recovery of Medicaid benefits allows for a
priority claim by the Department for the recovery of Medicaid benefits provided to an
individual while his tort claim is proceeding, and reimbursement must be made by the
tortfeasor to Medicaid prior to disbursement to the recipient.

C.

A Supplemental Needs Trust Requires Reimbursement of Medicaid Prior to
its Creation.

Under ordinary circumstances, an individual is not eligible for Medicaid benefits
if he has resources exceeding $2,000.00.

This requirement is consistent with the

philosophy that Medicaid is the "payor of last resort," and continues to be a requirement
each month the recipient receives benefits.

If the individual's resources exceed the

$2,000.00 limit in one month, heishe does not receive benefits the following month and
must re-qualify for W h e r assistance.
Federal law permits the creation of a special needs trust for the benefit of
permanently disabled individuals under the age of 65, if the State will receive all amounts
remaining in the trust upon the death of the Medicaid recipient.

(42 U.S.C.

5 1396p(d)(4)(A)). Assets placed in a special needs trust (S.N.T.) may only be used to
meet the needs of the beneficiary that are not covered by Medicaid.

The assets of a

qualifying S.N.T. are not counted in determining Medicaid eligibility. Nothing in the
federal law authorizing S.N.T.'s alters the requirement that Medicaid recipients assign to
the State their right to payment for medical care from any third party, including, but not
limited to, payments arising out of personal injury lawsuits. See 42 U.S.C.
Appellant's Brief - 5.

5 1396k.

Idaho law places restrictions on the creation of special needs trusts. Idaho Code

5 68-1405(4) requires that "...a court order for payment of money...to a special needs trust
shall include a provision that all statutory liens...in favor of the Idaho deparknent of
health and welfare...shall be satisfied first."
Idaho Code 5 56-209b(6) provides, in part, as follows:
If a settlement or judgment is received by the recipient without delineating
what portion of the settlement or judgment is in payment of medical
expenses, it will be presumed that the settlement or iudgment amlies first
to the medical expenses incurred by the recipient in an amount equal to the
expenditure for medical assistance benefits paid by the department as a
result of the occurrence giving rise to the payment or payments to the
recipient.
Idaho Code $56-209b(6). (Emphasis added).
D.

Ahlborn Requires Reimbursement of Medicaid Benefits Allocated to Medical
Expense by the Settlement.

A recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling, Arkansas Department of Health and Human

Services v. Ahlbom, 126 S.Ct 1752 (2006), has caused confusion among those who are
not familiar with Medicaid.

In that decision, the Supreme Court held that a State's

reimbursement for Medicaid expenditures could only be made against those recoveries
intended to compensate an accident victim for resulting medical expenses. Historically,
Medicaid took its reimbursement from the entire settlement monies, even if that meant
the recipient was left with nothing. It was a position forced on the various States by the
federal govemment through its regulatory agency, and lei? the various state Medicaid
agencies with little or no authority to "negotiate" a claim for reimbursement. Ahlbom at
1766.

In ARlborn, the Supreme Court decided that those regulations were in conflict
with the federal Medicaid statutes.
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It said that if a portion of the settlement is

specifically allocated to non-medical expenses such as pain and suffering, and/or loss of
consortium, that amount could not be subject to Medicaid's lien; Medicaid agencies can
only recover expenses from that portion of the settlement that is meant to reimburse the
Medicaid recipient for medical expenses, not for other damages. Ahlborn at 1761.
However, once that decision regarding the amount of the settlement that is
allocated, or should be allocated, to medical expenses is made the process by which that
portion of the recovery is disbursed is a question of state law. Ahlbom at 1765.
Idaho has such a process in place to provide guidance in the proper distribution of
the monies allocated by Matey. Idaho Code fi 56-209b, Idaho Code fi 68-1405 and
Davis v. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, 130 Idaho 469, 943 P.2d 59 (1997),
provide the framework suggested by Ahlborn at 1765 FN 17.
This case can and should be resolved using these tools and no others.
The confusion regarding Ahlborn has arisen because of the unique way in which
the question was presented to the court and the application of Arkansas law.
Much like here, Ahlbom involved the victim of an automobile accident. In that
case, Arkansas provided Medicaid assistance in the amount of more than $215,645.30 for
medical care arising from the injuries sustained in the accident. The Medicaid recipient,
without the prior knowledge of the state agency, settled the tort action arising out of the
accident for $550,000. Her complaint against the alleged tortfeasor had claimed damages
of over $3 million. The settlement did not contain an allocation of damages between
medical costs and other damages, such as lost or impaired earnings and pain and
suffering. Following the longstanding interpretation of the federal Medicaid agency,
Arkansas insisted it had a lien upon, and the right to be reimbursed from the entire
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settlement, without regard to how the damages might be allocated between medical and
other costs. Perhaps because Arkansas was so certain of its position, it stipulated that, in
that particular case, the medical damages were only one sixth of the total settlement.
This was, apparently, calculated as the total amount of damages alleged divided by the
ultimate settlement amount. In other words, since the Medicaid recipient recovered one
sixth of the total amount of alleged damages, the Medicaid recovery amount would be
one sixth of the total amount of Medicaid payments made.

There was no Arkansas

statute or rule of law that informed this stipulation; rather, it was merely a concession to
simplify presentation of the issue to the court: whether Arkansas' claim was against the
entire settlement or only a portion of that settlement allocated to medical expenses.
The Supreme Court first held that the assignment provisions of federal Medicaid
law--requiring states to enact laws providing for assignment of Medicaid beneficiaries'
rights to seek and collect payment for medical care from a responsible third party--only
provide for a limited assignment fiom the recipient to the state for payment for medical
items and services &om a liable third party. Ahlborn concluded that statutes (or federal
agency guidelines) providing for an assignment or lien against the non-medical portion of
a tort recovery would be inconsistent with the Medicaid "anti-lien" statute, 42 U.S.C.

5 139613, which prohibits states from placing liens against or seeking recovery of benefits
from a Medicaid beneficiary before her death.

Ahlborn at 1755.

According to the

Court, while the assignment provisions create an exception to the anti-lien statute for
recovery of payments that constitute reimbursement for medical costs, a recovery of
settlement funds intended to reimburse the Medicaid beneficiary for pain and suffering,
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lost wages, or other non-medical damages would constitute an impermissible lien on the
beneficiary's property. Ahlborn at 1762.
The Supreme Court's decision is straightforward. However, confusion has arisen
because of the stipulation in Ahlborn which was not required or approved by the Supreme
Court and was not any part of the Supreme Court's ruling. In our case, the Magistrate
seems to have concluded that since, in Ahlborn, Arkansas stipulated that it could be
reimbursed for only that proportion of Medicaid expenses in relationship to
damages, that Idaho too must be limited to that proportion of Medicaid expenses to the
total alleged damages in this case. In other words, the Magistrate imposed Arkansas'
stipulation in Ahlborn, on the State of Idaho. Under this rationale, the higher and
however unrealistic the allegation of damages in the complaint, the smaller would be the
relative Medicaid recovery. This is simply wrong, and not allowed by law.
Even if Matey could unilaterally allocate the damages in this case, as the
Magistrate allowed, but Ahlborn disapproves,' the Department would $
be
i
J
allowed
reimbursement of its entire amount expended for Matey's medical care in this case.
The Matey allocation (R pg.56) was as follows:

i

Allocation agreements simply between plaintiff's
counsel and the alleged tortfeasor's counsel
will likely not be sufficient and might very well run afoul of "the risk that parties to a tort suit will
at 1765; J. Mark Coulson, Supreme Court Reallocate away the State's interest..
defines Personal Injury Playing Field, 40-FEB Md. B.J. 58.

."
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Type of Damage

Amount of Settlement

Past Medical expenses (Medicaid)

$3,818.26

Medical expenses (Other)

$21,718.42

Miscellaneous Expenses*

$1,887.44

* (Past)
Lost Earnings * (Future)

$1,174.34
$159,559.32

Lost Household Services

$21,256.42

Future Medical Expenses

$1,023,731.48

Lost Earnings

Non Economic Damages

*

$16,845.32

According to Ahlborn, the Department's statutory lien does not apply to those
damages marked with an asterisk. Ahlborn at 1762. However, it does apply to those that
are unmarked. Therefore, the funds available for satisfaction of the Department's lien
under the holding of Ahlborn, and subject to the Department's statutory lien, are as
follows:
Type of Damage

Amount of Settlement

Past Medical expenses (Medicaid)

$3,818.26

Medical expenses (Other)

$21,718.42

Future Medical Expenses

$1,023,731.48

Permissible "lien" pursuant to Ahlborn.

1 $1,049,268.00

The pertinent language of Ahlborn requires this result:
...[w]e must decide whether ADHS can lay claim to more than the

portion of Ahlborn settlement that represents medical expenses.
Ahlborn at 1760.
Accordingly, what 42 U.S.C. § 1396k@)requires is that the State
be paid first out of any damages representing payments for medical care
before the recipient can recover any of her own costs for medical care.
Ahlborn at 1762.
But that provision 142 U.S.C. $ 1396k@)] does not authorize the
State to demand reimbursement from portions of the settlement allocated
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.

or allocable to nonmedical damages; instead, it gives the State a priority
disbursement from the medical expenses portion alone. See supra, at
1762.
Ahlborn at 1767.
Because the amount allocated to medical expenses exceeds the amount Medicaid
has expended in the past for Matey, the Department must be reimbursed for all of the
Medicaid benefits paid.
Only if the amount permitted by Ahlborn were less than the amount expended by
Medicaid (as of the date of creation of the special needs trust), would the Department
receive less that expended, but it would receive all the monies allocated to medical
expenses.
Absent a stipulation, a reduction of the past medical expenses, in any situation
seems inappropriate.

Matey would not be able to go back to his medical providers and

offer them, or force them to accept .03% of the bill for their services simply because the
plaintiffs chose to settle for an amount less than his actual damages. Medicaid paid those
providers according to its agreement with them. Matey now needs to reimburse Medicaid
according to his agreement. See Davis v. Idaho Devt of Health and Welfare, 130 Idaho
469, at 472.
The interpretation of Ahlborn proposed by Matey, and accepted by the lower
court is not reasonable. Congress and the Idaho Legislature could not intend such a
construction of a federal and state statute. A statute designed to reimburse federal and
state public assistance law should not be construed to allow only 3 cents on every ten
dollars expended as reimbursement.
The objective in interpreting a statute or ordinance is to derive the intent of the
legislative body that adopted it. Pa~etteRiver Prov. Owners Ass'n, 132 Idaho 557, 976
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P.2d 483 (1999). Such analysis begins with the literal language of the enactment. Id.
Where the language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body
must be given effect, and there is no occasion for a court to consider rules of statutory
construction. Id. An ordinance is ambiguous where reasonable minds might differ or be
uncertain as to its meaning. Id. However, ambiguity is not present merely because the
parties present differing interpretations to the court. Id. Constructions that would lead to
absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Id. "Language of a particular
section need not be viewed in a vacuum. And all sections of applicable statutes must be
construed together so as to determine the legislature's intent." Friends of Farm to Market

Rd 137 Idaho 197,46 P.3d 14 (2002).

d,

As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Ahlbom, the intent of the legislature was to
provide reimbursement only from that portion of the settlement that represented medical
expenses. It did not further reduce the amount available for reimbursement. Ahlborn at
1760.
Respondent's unreasonable construction does nothing but create a breach between
the Medicaid recipient and Medicaid by insisting that the more damages the recipient can
allege, the smaller the amount available to reimburse Medicaid. Here, Matey insists that
if he alleges $26 million in damages he can, and in fact does, dwarf or eliminate his
Medicaid debt.
Under Idaho Code § 56-209b(5) the Department

... shall have priority to any amount received from a third party or entity which
can reasonably be construed to compensate the recipient for the occurrence giving rise to
the need for medical assistance whether the settlement or judgment is obtained through
the subrogation right of the department or through recovery by the recipient, and whether
the recipient is made whole by the amount recovered.
The statute goes on to state specifically that the
Appellant's Brief - 12.

...department will be entitled to reimbursement of medical
assistance benefits paid on behalf of the recipient arising from the incident
or occurrence
to any amount being distributed to the recipient.
[Emphasis added.]

a

The Supreme Court specifically approved of this process: what 42 U.S.C.

5 1396k(b) requires

is that the State be paid first out of any damages representing

payments for medical care before the recipient can recover any of her own costs for
medical care." Ahlborn at 1762.
Idaho Code

5

56-209b(5) constitutes the "special rule" as contemplated by the

U.S. Supreme Court, suggested by footnote 17 of the decision in Ahlborn which should
be employed by this Court to meet "concerns about settlement manipulation." AhIborn at
1765.
No federal court decision has been reached defining the specific ramifications of
Ahlborn on Medicaid cases as of this writing.

Most Courts, and the federal courts in

particular are finding ways to distinguish Ahlborn. Cf. Estate of Ramirez, 14 Misc.3d
480, 826 N.Y.S.2d.

553, (2006) (Held that Estate Recovery is not affected by the

limitations of Ahlborn) and Wal-Mart v. Shank, 500 F.3d 834 (2007). (ERISA is not

-

affected by Ahlborn. Federal courts can't change federal statutes which are clear and
unambiguous).

The Court held that neither the "make whole" or the "pro rata" approach was
appropriate relief within the meaning of ERISA.
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at 839.

Unlike Ahlborn, Shank was decided strictly on contract law and the Court held
that "the Plan" was not limited in its reimbursement to only that portion of a judgment or
settlement that covered medical expenses. Shank at 839.2
The

court also said that Ahlborn does not support the extension of its

holding to an ERISA action.
The Supreme court there addressed a state law that required Medicaid recipients
who obtains a judgment or settlement against a third party to reimburse the State for all
payments made on their behalf. The Court concluded that the state reimbursement
statute "squarely conflict with the ...federal Medicaid laws," which entitled a State only
that portion of a judgment or settlement that covered medical expenses. Ahlborn at 1760,
at 839.
1761-1763,kUntil Ahlborn, all Medicaid recoveries were analyzed with an awareness of
contract law. The Medicaid recipient agreed, prior to accepting benefits, to the same
terms as those in the Wal-Mart Plan.
An argument has been made that the State's interpretation of Ahlborn would
discourage Medicaid recipients from taking action against the alleged tortfeasor because
the recipient would make no recoveries. Respondents will argue that the recipient would
take nothing because they have to repay the loan from Medicaid. It is not accurate. The
Medicaid recipient should not have all of his medical expenses paid by Medicaid and
then recover the same amount from the tortfeasor. A Medicaid recipient receives a pro
rata share of the attorney fees incurred in his suit and he does not pay more than the
medical expenses portion of the settlement or judgment, even if this is less than his debt
to Medicaid.
"Health plans are increasingly adopting language such as Wal-Mart's which
dictate that it is to be paid first out of any settlement, regardless of what remains for the
2

a

The Supreme Court did not need to reach this issue in
because its holding is so specific:
Medicaid reimbursement comes out of damages representing medical expenses.
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injured person.

Moreover, the victim is responsible for all legal costs in pursuing the

suit." Vanessa Fuhrmans, Accident Victim Face Grabfor Legal Winnings, Wall Street
Journal, November 20,2007. State and federal law has always been more reasonable.

IV. CONCLUSION

Federal law prohibits the department from reimbursement from that portion of the
judgment or settlement that represents pain and suffering and other non-medical
expenses. If that part of the settlement is adequate, reimbursement of the entire amount
representing the Medicaid expenses already paid for Matey is warranted because the law
and public policy provide a mechanism to enable public welfare agencies to recoup some
portion of their outlays, when possible, in order to ensure that the less fortunate can in the
future have access to medical care that they cannot otherwise afford.
*

.

Respectfully submitted this-
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day of May, 2008.
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